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 ABSTRACT 
This paper explores feminist ethical theories in regards to their ability to enrich Shannon 
Sullivan’s transactional epistemology (STE) presented in ​Living Across and Through Skins​. The 
feminist ethical theories that will be explored within this paper include care ethics, as presented 
by Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings, and responsibility ethics, as presented by Margaret Urban 
Walker. In order for a theory to enrich STE it must have an understanding of the person and 
environments as mutually constitutive of one another and subsequently apply this understanding 
to effectively address oppressive attitudes and behaviours, particularly those found in the 
application of rigid gender binaries, in a way that aims to dismantle them. Sullivan describes 
such an understanding of persons through the notion of “transactional bodies” and asserts that 
this understanding is significant to the goal of improving bodily existence. Sullivan places this 
goal of improving bodily existence as central to her philosophy, and to any philosophy that 
explores corporeal existence. The feminist ethical theory that best addresses the application of 
rigid gender binaries and thus contributes to STE’s goal of improving bodily existence will be 
best suited for enriching STE.  
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Glover 1 
This paper will explore how feminist ethical theories operate within the transactional 
epistemology developed by Shannon Sullivan in ​Living Across and Through Skins​. Sullivan’s 
transactional epistemology (STE) presents a comprehensive way of knowing the world that takes 
into account the complexity of the person and the environments that influence the person. 
According to STE, we can most accurately understand the world through the mutually 
constitutive interaction between individuals and environments. Sullivan, however, notably 
characterizes what people often call “interaction” as “transaction”, thus establishing the basis for 
STE. It is through an exploration and understanding of transactions that people gain knowledge, 
thus allowing for knowledge to be grounded in real lived experiences. It is in this deep 
connectedness of knowledge with lived experiences that feminist ethical theories can find 
common ground with STE. 
This paper will explore the mutual goal that STE and feminist ethical theories share of 
improving bodily existence in the world by understanding the world through the multiplicity of 
individual lived experiences and the acknowledgement and examination of environments in 
which those perspectives have developed (Sullivan, 2001, p. 5). People exist within various 
environments with which they continually transact. Understanding how these various 
environments influence people is important to understanding how the gender binary is 
maintained. And addressing the role and impact of harmful gender binaries is an essential means 
for understanding individual lived experiences and moving towards the shared goal of improving 
bodily existence in the world, as the application of rigid gender binaries has long been used as a 
tool of oppression. I wish to highlight the importance of feminist ethical theories within STE by 
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providing an account of how feminist ethical theories, specifically care ethics and an ethics of 
responsibility, contribute to STE, particularly in their ability to address rigid gender binaries.  
After presenting STE as the basis for this paper’s discussion, I will examine care ethics 
and responsibility ethics respectively in relation to STE’s major tenets in order to weigh the 
potential of each theory for enriching STE. In order for a theory to enrich STE it must understand 
the person and the environments as mutually constitutive of one another and apply this 
understanding to effectively address oppressive attitudes and behaviours, particularly those 
found in the application of rigid gender binaries, in a way that aims to dismantle them. This act 
of effectively addressing gender binaries constitutes action towards improving bodily existence. 
Thus, the feminist ethical theory that most accurately follows this path will be best suited for 
enriching STE by contributing to the realization of the goal of improving bodily existence. 
Section 1: ​Sullivan’s Transactional Epistemology 
 
In ​Living Across and Through Skins​, Shannon Sullivan draws inspiration from pragmatist 
and feminist philosophers to establish her transactional epistemology. To begin, Sullivan draws 
her use of the word “transactional” from John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy which places an 
emphasis on the physical body. The body, and thus the individual, can be defined by what 
Dewey describes as “transactions” (Sullivan, 2001, p.1). From this account, Sullivan (2001) 
seeks to "explore corporeal existence as transactional,” by delving into the complex transactions 
that constitute bodily existence (p. 1). For Sullivan, using the notion of transactional bodies as 
the basis for her inquiry allows for understanding to be grounded in concrete lived experience, so 
as to avoid becoming overly abstract and, thus, risk losing applicability to real life (Sullivan, 
2001, p. 4). Wishing to move away from abstract theory, what Sullivan (2001) presents is still 
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very much a theory, though one which “returns to concrete bodily life in order to test its fruits in 
lived experience.” (p. 4). Such a theory has very much to offer in regards to understanding 
human life in a maximally cohesive and intricate manner, a manner that does not attempt to 
divide the individual or view them separately from their environments. People exist within 
various environments and in order to understand a person we must understand the diverse 
influences that these environments have on a person and the influences a person in turn has on 
these environments through their transactions. There are three major points essential to 
understanding Sullivan’s transactional epistemology (STE) within the context of this paper, and 
these include the importance of the concept of “​transaction”​, a description of bodies as ​activity 
or doing, and the notion of ​discursivity​.  
Due to its particular definition and contrast with the word “interaction”, it is important to 
note Sullivan’s deliberate choice to use Dewey’s concept of “​transaction”. ​Sullivan’s 
exploration of transactional bodies provides insight into an understanding of ourselves, the 
world, and our place within it. To transact means for something to be exchanged in some manner 
in a “back and forth” type of dynamic (Sullivan, 2001, p. 14). The body and its environments are 
in the process of constant “mutual influence and impact” and “mutual transformation” of one 
another (Sullivan, 2001, p. 1). “Interaction” does not do what is being described here justice as it 
cannot provide an accurate picture of the complex and intricate relationship at play (Sullivan, 
2001, p. 13). The fundamental concern lies in the fact that “to interact” implies a body and 
environments which have developed and formed independently from one another, or in other 
words, are ontologically separate from one another, which is not the case (Sullivan, 2001, p. 12). 
Rather, taking the notion of exchange into account, “transaction” more fully captures the way a 
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body and its environments are entangled with one another in a complex manner by which they 
are in constant exchange. 
Sullivan describes the individual as a “transactional” body and, in order to understand 
what this entails, it helps to take a closer look at what is meant by the use of the word 
“transactional”. Transactions occur between our body and our environments, in a way that blurs 
the lines between self, other, and environment. To blur the lines is not to lose individual identity, 
but simply to understand the complex ways we shape and have been shaped by our environments 
and by one another, thus enriching our notion of identity. As Sullivan (2001) quotes Dewey, we 
live “as much in process across and ‘through’ skins as in process ‘within skins’” (p. 13). I point 
this out simply to highlight the notion that “identity” is not an internal and static construct; rather 
it is a process that occurs across transactions as part of a much larger picture that includes our 
environments (Sullivan, 2001, p. 13) Once we are able to view ourselves and one another on this 
larger scale, then the manifestation of more complex transactions found in social, political, and 
ethical matters can be addressed.  
An example of these complex transactions can be found in the application of rigid gender 
binaries within society. Sullivan (2001) addresses gender binaries as an important site for change 
because “current categories of sex and gender are extremely rigid: each member of the binary 
pair is defined in sharp opposition to the other” (p. 89). She claims that “the need to rethink 
contemporary conceptions of gender, and notions of sex and sexuality that transact with them, is 
urgent” because “the binary remains rigid and powerful enough to make life very dangerous for 
those who attempt to blur its boundaries.” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 89-90). Gender binaries are rigid in 
the way that they are applied. From the moment we are born we are categorized under the binary 
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of “boy” or “girl” and become subject to the socialization, restrictions, and potential harms that 
follow as a result of being categorized under one of these rigid labels. Once a person is 
categorized it is difficult to define oneself outside the limits of this label due to the restrictive and 
comprehensive character of such labels. Gender binaries, therefore, can be described as rigid. A 
strong understanding of gender binaries requires the intricate transactions that produce them, as 
well as the ways gender binaries themselves further influence these transactions, to be taken into 
account.  
Sullivan (2001) states that “the best way to understand and improve bodily existence is to 
concentrate on the environments and situations that effect bodies'' (p. 11). We are as much a 
product of the environment as the environment is a product of our existence within it, and 
understanding this is essential to the possibility of creating change. As a result, “the best way to 
attempt to change the world is to transform a body’s transactions with it” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 11). 
Addressing oppressive attitudes and behaviours is a significant way that bodily existence can be 
improved, as Sullivan highlights in the need to address the application of rigid gender binaries. 
Sullivan (2001) believes that “thinking about the world and the place of bodily existence in it 
should be at the heart of philosophy” and that thinking of bodies as transactional will be the best 
way to achieve this task (p. 11). This goal or theme of improving bodily existence is one that 
connects STE with feminist ethical theories and which makes exploring bodies as transactional 
so significant.  
Understanding ourselves as “transactional” is significant because it allows for a holistic 
understanding of the individual. In absence of this “holistic” understanding, we have many 
understandings of persons that artificially separate the person into component parts. These 
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understandings of the self attempt to divide and separate different ​aspects​ of the self as though 
these aspects were ontologically separate pieces, rather than the self being ontologically whole 
from the beginning. Understandings of the self that attempt to divide or fragment the self invoke 
assumptions that may act as obstacles to understanding bodies in the world. The assumptions that 
a transactional understanding overcomes include the dualism of self and world, in addition to the 
atomism which follows as a consequence of this dualism (Sullivan, 2001, p. 12). Both of these 
assumptions are harmful because they present a fragmented view of ourselves that ignores the 
essential roles that others play in shaping the self. These include the cultural, social, and political 
meanings that have unquestionably influenced who we are in addition to how we understand 
ourselves and the way we transact with others.  
To understand how these two assumptions are overcome, I would like to take a moment 
to look more closely at the body and the importance of Sullivan’s use of the term “​body”​ in 
particular. By “body”, Sullivan refers to the individual as a whole, rather than the body in 
isolation or as a material vessel that somehow houses the individual. There are many benefits to 
viewing ourselves in terms of “bodies” compared to ways that seek to divide our bodies into 
varying parts (such as a mind or a soul) that exist within a body. To overcome this obstacle, 
Sullivan uses the word “body” to describe the entirety of a person. By viewing the body as the 
person, we can then look at our bodies as an integral part of our environments, and vice versa. 
This can be made possible by understanding bodies in terms of activity, that is, in what bodies 
do​. When we view bodies in terms of activity, this activity is not internal and cut off from our 
environments, rather this activity ​is​ our transactions with our different environments.  
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Over time our transactions develop into habits, as “habits are formed in and through an 
organism’s transactions with its various environments” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 33-34). Bodies can 
thus be understood in terms of collections of actions that form into patterns of behaviour and 
patterns of behaviour that naturally form into habits (Sullivan, 2001, p.3). In viewing ourselves 
in terms of individual bodies and in terms of what our bodies do, it becomes essential to also 
view our environments at the same time, as this is the only space in which our body can act. This 
highlights how closely our habits are formed in response to our environments which means that 
the key to creating change exists in understanding and changing how these habits are formed.  
The first assumption a transactional understanding of the body overcomes is that of the 
dualism of self and world, understood through the opposition of “mind versus body”. What a 
transactional understanding is able to provide is a holistic account in which all aspects that have 
shaped and influenced an individual are acknowledged and taken into account. Since Sullivan’s 
notion of a transactional body firmly places the individual within the world, there is no “body” 
which appears within the world and then a mind which is ​separate​ from this body and untouched 
by said world. Other theories have described a mind which exists within a body, as well as a soul 
which is contained within or confined to a physical body, or anything else which presents the 
individual as fragmented. So rather than viewing ourselves within the confines of the “person in 
isolation” (i.e. a mind merely interacting with a body), STE aims to view ourselves as situated 
elements of our environments (Sullivan, 2001, p.4). In other words, by moving beyond the mind 
versus body dualism, focus can be given to the concrete aspects of how we transact with our 
environments.  
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STE provides a holistic account of the individual that allows attention to be drawn to the 
experienced world, as the “mind marks a particular way for some physical bodies who are 
organisms to transact with the world,” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 26). Rather, the mind ​is ​the body 
insofar as it is inseparable from the body and a necessary part of what it means to be human. In 
other words, there is no metaphysically distinct mind to discuss. The mind and all that constitutes 
it can instead be viewed as an ​activity​ of the body. The mind cannot be viewed in isolation from 
the physical body anymore than people can properly be viewed in isolation of the environments 
in which we exist. And so an understanding of the individual as a “transactional body” 
overcomes the problem of atomism, as we have our own identity, but an identity which is not 
separate from the environments in which we exist, and which cannot be understood in isolation 
from the environments in which we exist (Sullivan, 2001, p. 19).  
From here, we can now move beyond the belief that we are somehow beings separate and 
isolated from the world to begin understanding how the world is an important and inseparable 
part of who we are. This is significant because understanding the influence of our various 
environments as an inseparable part of who we are plays a crucial role in understanding 
important issues such as gender and the complex ways that gender roles can be used to restrict 
and harm individuals. Rather than gender being intrinsically linked to an individual, STE offers 
us a means of understanding gender as culturally and socially situated. In other words, we can 
understand gender as shaped, influenced, and perpetrated by current discourse. Sullivan 
describes this as the “discursivity” of the body which allows for one to be situated and thus 
further overcomes the problem of atomism. As such, the notion of “discursivity” is also essential 
to understanding Sullivan’s transactional epistemology. Bodies, and thus their habits, can be 
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understood as “discursive”, that is in relation to current discourse. Discourse includes the 
traditions, beliefs, and values of a culture and society. We cannot have an understanding of 
bodies which is separate from these cultural and social meanings of which they are a part 
(Sullivan, 2001, p. 41).  
Conceiving of bodies outside of these meanings and contexts, in terms of “pre- or 
nondiscursive” bodies, has traditionally been used to justify oppression of one group over 
another. This happens when understanding based on a description of bodies that has been 
divorced from the cultural, social, and political meanings which have shaped them becomes the 
basis for understanding the person as a whole (Sullivan, 2001, p. 41). As Sullivan (2001) 
describes, “anatomical differences often have been used to justify the social and political 
oppression of some groups over others, such as men over women, white people over people of 
colour, the ‘civilized’ European over the native ‘savage’” (p. 41).  
Removing the body from the cultural and social meanings which ​created​ these oppressive 
attitudes or habits further harms the people who are subject to these oppressive attitudes and 
habits. Instead of viewing oppressive attitudes and habits as products of our various 
environments, they are viewed as products of the body and thus shift blame to the recipients of 
these negative attitudes rather than viewing them as the victims that they are. Sullivan (2001) 
highlights this in the presence of rigid gender binaries within society that confine and limit one’s 
roles within society; as she states, to question and challenge this binary, “is to risk all the 
psychological, physical, emotional, financial, and other punishments that are meted out to gender 
traitors in society” (p. 89-91). In other words, our bodies cannot be understood outside of the 
cultural and social meanings that have shaped them. Discourse shapes our habits for transacting 
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with the world, and it is from these habits that oppressive attitudes can develop. And as these 
types of habits become rigid and inflexible, this can result in the “enslavement” of an individual 
(Sullivan, 2001, p. 33). It becomes essential that we are able to “recognize the discursivity of 
gendered bodies not to neglect lived, bodily experience, but precisely so that one might better 
understand and slowly transform it” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 63). In other words, if we can understand 
ourselves and others as discursive bodies, then we can begin to see how certain habits have been 
formed and we can begin to break down our own oppressive attitudes and those of society.  
This discourse may place or remove certain pressures on an individual that ultimately 
contributes to who the person is as a whole. For example, those categorized by society as 
“biologically female” will experience very different transactions with their environments than 
those categorized as “biologically male”. Studies have observed adults “transacting” differently 
with an infant depending on whether they were told the infant is male or female (Delk, Madden, 
Livingston, et. al., 1986). Researchers found that those who were told a child was female 
interacted with the child in feminine stereotyped ways and vice versa when told the child was 
male (Delk, Madden, Livingston, et. al., 1986).  These differences in transactions continue 
throughout one’s childhood, into adolescence, throughout the entirety of one’s life, and will 
ultimately contribute to the development of different gendered habits in each individual. These 
gendered habits will then further reinforce certain attitudes that society holds about men and 
women, whether positive or negative.  
As a result of the mutual constitution of individuals and their environments, which 
includes the current discourse, Sullivan (2001) states that “the best way to attempt to change the 
world is to transform a body’s transactions with it” (p. 11). In adopting a view of the self and the 
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world that adheres to Sullivan’s theory, we can become more aware of the ways that we are 
transacting with our environments and how our environments, which include the current 
discourse, influence or affect the ways that we are transacting. This awareness can be applied to 
the categorization of individuals within the gender binary as either male or female. If people are 
categorized as female, for example, they are expected to transact with their environments in 
rather specific and often limited ways. The best way to address gender binaries then is to 
transform how we transact in gendered ways.  
Sullivan (2001) suggests that this can be done by experiencing certain gendered habits 
outside of the types of transactions that have helped to form them (p. 106). This can help us 
become particularly aware of and ultimately question the habit. One way we can create change in 
the world comes from challenging the gender binary in this way. We can describe this as an 
attempt at transforming a body’s transactions with its environments, and thus help contribute to 
Sullivan’s goal of changing the world for the better. Since gendered habits have formed through 
certain transactions within specific environments or situations, witnessing or experiencing the 
performance of these gendered habits outside of the context in which they have been traditionally 
formed serves as a powerful way to challenge and question them. When we become more aware 
of gendered habits and begin to question and challenge them this serves as an important act of 
weakening the application of a rigid gender binary as the line that often harshly divides 
“male/masculine” and “female/feminine” will begin to become blurred.  
It follows that this breaking down of gender binaries can aid in giving rise to an increased 
possibility for change. As Sullivan (2001) states in the beginning of ​Living Across and Through 
Skins,​ she wishes to “explore corporeal existence as transactional,” and, in the process, explore 
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“some of the social, political, ethical, and epistemological implications of transactional bodies.” 
(p. 1). This is important, because exploring the implications of transactional bodies in these 
various spheres of human life shows how these transactions might be changed in order to affect 
positive change on a personal level. It begins with acknowledging the role and impact of gender 
binaries on our transactions within these realms. This has the potential to create a “chain 
reaction” by means of continual, more conscious, transactions with the world. Change is often 
something that occurs slowly over time, but through adopting a view of the world and the 
individual as prescribed by STE, we can begin understanding how these changes are possible.  
Exploring other areas of thought, such as ethics, within the context of STE encourages us 
to question ​how​ and ​what​ transactions have helped to form these theories that have been widely 
accepted and for whom they are beneficial. Sullivan (2001) summarizes the importance of 
understanding bodies as transactional to the continual process of change: 
holding that bodily activities are shaped by transactions with their environments is 
valuable to philosophy in particular, and to life in general, because such an understanding 
of bodying encourages people to ask whether, when, how, and for whom those 
transactions are beneficial (p. 64).  
Asking these sorts of questions encourages greater self-awareness of harmful transactions, such 
as those most heavily influenced by gender binaries, and improves our ability to critically 
examine those types of transactions. The ability to acknowledge and examine harmful 
transactions in day-to-day life creates the potential for increasing the rate at which changes to 
these transactions might occur.  
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A transactional understanding of the world would require an ethical theory that is not 
overly abstract and thus inapplicable to the real lived experience that it addresses. By “overly 
abstract” I am referring to ethical theories that move beyond individual experiences in an attempt 
to attain objectivity, or a “neutral, ‘God’s eye’ point of view, which feminists have shown to be 
covertly masculine” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 5). Moving forward it will remain important to 
continually return to lived experiences to test the fruits of the ethical theories to be addressed. 
Since gender binaries will be a common theme traced throughout this paper, it will be important 
to examine the ways that these ethical theories are influenced by gender binaries and to what 
degree they contribute to either maintaining or breaking them down. The result of these inquiries 
will reveal which feminist ethical theory is best suited for enriching STE and contributing to the 
goal of improving bodily existence in the world.  
Section 2: ​How care ethics can enrich STE 
Care ethics first emerged out of Carol Gilligan’s (1982) work as a psychologist studying 
morality and moral development, and can be seen as a direct critique of popular developmental 
models in psychology at the time which “implicitly adopt[ed] the male life as norm, [and] tried 
to fashion women out of a masculine cloth” (pp. 1, 6). Gilligan’s (1982) ​In a Different Voice: 
Psychological Theory and Women’s Development,​ was concerned in particular with the theory of 
moral development posited by Lawrence Kohlberg (p. 18). Kohlberg’s work and his notion of 
‘moral maturity’ was “derived from the study of men’s lives and reflects the importance of 
individuation in their development” and, therefore, is inapplicable to women and instead 
becomes a tool to support the notion of their moral inferiority to men (Gilligan, 1982, p. 17, 18). 
In other words, “a problem in theory became cast as a problem in women’s development” 
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(Gilligan, 1982, p. 7). “Care thinking” emerged largely in opposition to what Gilligan (1982) 
referred to as “justice thinking”, or the type of moral thought favoured by men (p. 164, 167; 
Saul, 2003, p. 212).  
Care ethics is favourable for the purpose of enriching STE due to its attention to the 
existence of gender binaries, the way it views the individual as transactional, and its 
acknowledgement of the influence of discourse. Gilligan (1982), through the course of her own 
work, developed her theory of “care thinking” as an approach to morality favoured by women (p. 
164; Saul, 2003, p. 212). We can see how Gilligan (1982) attempts to address the gender binary 
through her belief that this “different voice” she is describing is “characterized not by gender but 
theme” and that “its association with women is an empirical observation” (p. 2). She attempts to 
address gender binaries by including the experiences of women in theories that are otherwise 
based solely on specific men and their experiences, and then passed off as “gender neutral” 
(Gilligan, 1982, p. 6). This acknowledgment of the gender binary is an important feature of care 
ethics as it moves moral theory a step away from those theories that use “male as norm” then 
present them as “gender neutral”. For this reason, care ethics can find some common ground 
with STE, in terms of its concerns regarding gender.  
Care ethics also views people in a way that supports Sullivan’s transactional 
understanding of individuals. Carol Gilligan (1982) describes the development of female gender 
identity as an “ongoing process of attachment that creates and sustains the human community” 
(p. 156). Jennifer Saul, on Gilligan’s care ethics, explains that “women view themselves 
primarily as situated in a complex web of interrelationships, [and] emphasize particular contexts 
over general principles” (Saul, 2003, p. 213). We can see here how care ethics might be relevant 
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to STE as it describes the individual as “situated in a complex web of interrelationships”, thus 
taking into account the mutually constitutive or “transactional” nature of our existence. By 
situating the individual and placing an emphasis on the role of community and “particular 
contexts over general principles,” care ethics continues to present ideas shared by STE by taking 
the environments and others into account. Within ethics, the task of “situating” oneself becomes 
imperative because “more philosophers are in the plane of morality, not hovering above it or 
perched outside it,” and as such, ethical theories must be understood as emerging from a 
“particular social place” (Walker, p. 26, 27).  
Lastly, care ethics also takes the discursivity of individuals into account. As necessarily 
situated, we must be situated within a certain discourse, which means that in order to understand 
someone’s situation or perspective we must first understand their actions as influenced by the 
customs, beliefs, and traditions of the community in which they find themselves. By “situating” 
ourselves, we are acknowledging that the culture and society in which we live plays an integral 
part in who we are. In other words, we are part of many different communities and our 
“transactions” within these communities. Care ethics views individuals as “fundamentally 
interdependent” in that we continually require care from others throughout our lives in order to 
flourish (Saul, 2003, p. 214). This “interdependence” can be compared to a major belief of STE: 
we do not exist nor can we be understood in isolation from one another. It is in this notion of 
“interdependence” that we can see the role of community emerge. If all humans are 
interdependent in varying ways, then every individual exists as a member of a community or 
communities. We cannot be understood in isolation, just as we do not exist in isolation from 
other humans. The community in which we live exists as a necessary part of our environments 
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and as such plays an essential role in who we are. As we go on, we will continue to see how 
these similarities can be used to enrich STE.  
Before exploring how these similarities can enrich STE, we will first contrast care ethics 
with traditional ethical theories to demonstrate the shortcomings of traditional ethical theories 
within STE and to highlight the strengths of care ethics for enriching STE. In her article, ​The 
revolutionary fact of compassion: William James, Buddhism, and the feminist ethics of care​, 
Cathryn Bailey (2012) describes “traditional ethical theories” as favouring “values associated 
with men, such as individualistic autonomy and abstract justice” (p. 184). These types of theories 
have been criticized by feminists for the fact that they often “obscure the particularity of moral 
actors and relations by emphasizing universality, sameness, and repeatability, excluding or 
regimenting emotional experience” (Walker, p. 51). “Traditional” ethical theories fail to account 
for the reality of different individual experiences and instead “stem in part from the assumption 
that there is a single mode of social experience and interpretation” and that “single mode” comes 
from the lives of certain men (Gilligan, 1982, p. 173). Traditional ethical theories, therefore, are 
harmful within STE and can be contrasted with care ethics on three particular grounds: the harms 
and limits of attempting to establish an objective moral theory, the characteristics of the moral 
agent, and the role of reason versus emotions in addressing moral dilemmas.  
Objectivity attempts to reach an understanding of the world that is not influenced by 
human experience or emotion. Since all understandings of the world emerge from individual 
perspectives and experiences such a task is impossible to achieve. Many standard ethical theories 
relied on what Gilligan referred to as “justice thinking”, which emphasizes objectivity, universal 
principles, impartiality, reason, and rights (Saul, 2003, p. 210). Due to the fact that each person 
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employing “justice thinking” would necessarily be doing so from their own limited perspective 
which would have been shaped and influenced by their transactions with their environments, 
such “objective” and “impartial” ideas are impossible to reach in reality. There can be no "God's 
eye perspective" of understanding a person’s actions. Relying on a “supposedly universal list of 
moral directives” becomes inaccurate and insincere on the part of the proponents of such theories 
(Bailey, 2012, p. 191). There is no “objective and universalizable” account of what actions are 
right or wrong, or when and why they are right or wrong because our actions are always 
influenced by the time and place in which they are occurring. What action might be wrong in one 
situation could be right in another; in other words, there are simply too many “grey areas” and 
objectivity lacks the perspective to address them.  
With this lack of perspective, traditional ethical theories have potential for harm in the 
form of oppression through gender and other biases (Walker, p. 51). The notion of “objective and 
universally grounded moral theories,” which characterize standard moral philosophies 
“have...been used as instruments of oppression and exclusion.” (Bailey, 2012, p. 184). Women 
have been “carefully socialized into their feminine roles” by society, a fact that is often ignored 
by traditional moral theorists who, instead of suggesting that women should be afforded the same 
opportunities to develop their capacities as men, would rather claim that women simply don’t 
have those capacities (Saul, 2003, p. 200-202). Care ethics acknowledges that these differences 
between men and women are due to their gendered “transactions” with the world rather than an 
innate characteristic found in the hypothetical “nondiscursive body”, that STE rejects (Gilligan, 
1982, p. 2).  
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Accounts of what is right or wrong, or good or bad, are not objective and universally 
grounded, but “rather [right and wrong, good and bad] emerge from our experience and are to be 
transformed by use,” which is the basis on which an ethics of care operates (Bailey, 2012, p. 
191).What is right or wrong can be revealed only when environments, including the current 
discourse within those environments, are used as the backdrop for such inquiries.  It is only 
through such a practice that ethics can take on any sort of valuable meaning and provide practical 
advice. Traditional ethical theories, “prescribe the representation of morality as a compact, 
propositionally codifiable, impersonally action-guiding code within an agent,” that “demotes a 
great deal of what is known, felt, and acted out in moral relations to ‘nonmoral’--merely factual 
or collateral--information” (Walker, 1998, p. 7, 8). Essentially, care ethics allows for the 
transactional and discursive aspects of existence to be included in its analysis of ethical problems 
on a situation by situation basis.  
Care ethics confronts objectivity by positing a theory that attempts to explain the reality 
of morality found in real lived experiences. Nel Noddings (2013), who helped to develop an 
ethics of care out of Gilligan’s initial work, states, “if a substantial segment of humankind 
approaches moral problems through a consideration of the concrete elements of situations and a 
regard for themselves as caring, then perhaps an attempt should be made the enlighten the study 
of morality in this alternative mode” (p. 28). This involves viewing the individual within their 
various environments. So where other ethical theories have failed to view the individual as 
inseparable from their environment and the current discourse, care ethics does not. Since care 
ethics takes into account the transient nature of existence and the need to assess each moral 
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decision individually within its particular context, it can be said to reject objectivity and thus 
align with STE’s major tenets.  
Within traditional ethical theories that aim to be objective, the type of moral agent that 
must be posited is completely incompatible with STE’s major tenets. Ethical theories that 
prioritize “justice thinking” view “moral agents as autonomous individuals rather than beings 
thoroughly enmeshed in connections with and dependencies on others” (Saul, 2003, p. 213). 
These kinds of ethical theories, therefore, cannot align with the idea of the body as transactional 
and discursive. This can become harmful because it removes the moral agent from their 
environments, and in doing so, misses many variables necessary for making a fair moral 
judgement or decision. In addition to this, ethical theories have traditionally pushed the primacy 
of reason over emotion in making judgements and aiming for “mathematical type certainty”. 
Again this is not cohesive with STE because it removes the need for context that transactions and 
discourse provide. It would follow then that standard ethical theories are insufficient and, thus, a 
different ethical theory is needed that will work in greater unity with the major tenets of STE.  
In contrast, care ethics provides better means for viewing the “transactional body” within 
the realm of ethics because it provides an account of ethics which is applicable to STE and thus 
posits a much more favourable moral agent than traditional ethical theories. Care ethics has the 
potential to create a move towards positive change by questioning and rejecting the views found 
in traditional “masculinist” ethical theories that “ignore or degenerate the role of emotion in 
knowing and interacting with the world” (Bailey, 2012, p. 195). And in doing so, Noddings 
(2013) explains that a difficulty arises when we approach “morality or ethical behaviour from a 
rational-cognitive approach”, because “we fail to share with each other the feelings, the conflicts, 
 
 
Glover 20 
the hopes and ideas that influence our eventual choices” (p. 8).The way that we think and feel 
can be described as an aspect of how we transact, because STE holds hope for potential positive 
change, it would follow that a theory of ethics which takes into account these transactions could 
help to enrich STE.  
The role of reason versus emotion has long been debated within ethics as traditional 
ethical theories have prized reason as the epitome of what it means to be human; what separates 
us from other living organisms. In doing so, a large portion of human experiences have been 
ignored and shut off as unimportant. It is here in ethics, and in philosophy in general, that we can 
identify the reason versus emotion dualism that has not only prized reason as the only means 
capable of examining ethical problems, but has also been used as a means of oppression against 
women. This dichotomy links directly to gender binaries. Reason has been associated positively 
with men, as a means of explaining why there have historically been more male thinkers in 
academia for example. Seemingly only men act in accordance with their reason and only reason 
is needed to be a good thinker. While emotions have been negatively associated with women, as 
an attempt to discourage women from becoming such thinkers. Supposedly to think in a way that 
utilizes emotion in any capacity is to be a poor thinker. This either/or condition of the reason 
versus emotions dichotomy, in which people are described as applying ​only ​reason or ​only 
emotion while thinking, is a rigid and fragmented way to view thought processes. This 
dichotomy links directly to gender binaries because it is rigidly applied to different people based 
on the gender society has categorized that person as. 
Care ethics addresses the reason versus emotion problem by introducing caring as a real 
means of addressing ethical problems. Instead of favouring reason or emotions, care ethics takes 
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an important step towards dismantling this dichotomy by acknowledging the need for reason and 
emotions to work together and inform one another. Since caring has long been viewed as a duty 
for women to concern themselves with inside the home it has been viewed as unimportant or 
unworthy of examination. Caring has largely been associated with women due to the fact that the 
act of caring about someone often involves emotional labour. Care ethics gives attention to this 
aspect of bodily experience found in our emotions, thus presenting emotions as capable of 
playing an important role within ethics. In addressing this reason versus emotions dichotomy, 
care ethics is taking an important step towards addressing the gender binaries that the dichotomy 
reinforces.  
Care ethics is important to STE because it provides the means for not only viewing 
individuals within the realm of ethics in such a way that is consistent with STE, but which also 
provides potential for mediating these harms. Sullivan (2001) points towards the need for 
different areas of thought to come together so as to enrich one another, which is evident through 
her own use of “cross-fertilizing of pragmatism and feminism, along with phenomenological and 
genealogical philosophy” to advance philosophy in a positive direction (p. 170). So it would be 
consistent with Sullivan’s beliefs that there is much to be learned by “cross-fertilizing” different 
areas of thought to arrive at her goal of improving transactions. Improving transactions through 
addressing the existence of rigid gender binaries is an important part of this.  
Where traditional ethical theories relied on the experiences of men, care ethics brings 
forward experiences of women as an equally important part of moral theorizing. In doing so, care 
ethics allow for us to experience gendered habits (i.e. how women assess moral problems) as a 
legitimate voice, thus, allowing a theory to be built that relies on the experiences of women. This 
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is an important step forward in terms of improving human transactions because it legitimizes the 
experiences and voices of at least some women in an area of thought that has otherwise been 
dominated by men’s experiences and voices. In addition, the new legitimization of experiences 
and voices of women works to further challenge gender binaries by utilizing traditional feminine 
roles in a non-traditional way. The gendered habit of caring, which has long been a “woman’s 
labour”, is being expressed outside of the transactions that had originally formed them, namely 
performing caring labour in the home. Care ethics has instead presented caring as an ethical 
standpoint, thus taking it beyond the act of caring for one’s family and home out of necessity. 
The experience of the gendered habit of caring outside of the transactions that had formed it has 
certainly caused many to become aware of and question the absence of such experiences within 
the field of ethics up to that point.  
Care ethics is important in STE because it examines transactional bodies as moral agents 
through an ethics that is consistent with STE’s ideas. Viewing bodies within an ethical discourse 
can provide not only a deeper understanding of the importance of understanding bodies as 
transactional and discursive, but a demonstration of the importance of STE as a theory in 
general. In addition, we can consider the importance it holds for moving beyond harmful and 
oppressive attitudes that opposing theories may perpetrate. Through care ethics, a more 
comprehensive and ​holistic​ account of the individual is developed because an ethics of care takes 
into account the context of each situation in question, including “the participants, their feelings, 
needs, impressions, and so on” (Nodding, 2013, p. 3). Much like STE moves attention to more 
productive concerns (by moving past the mind-body dualism), so too does an ethics of care move 
attention to more productive concerns by moving past the reason versus emotion dualism within 
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ethics or the alleged need for an objective theory. These ‘more productive concerns’ include 
oppressive attitudes perpetrated by the opposing theories and provide support for Sullivan’s 
ultimate goal of enhancing bodily existence.  
Section 3: ​How care ethics gave rise to responsibility ethics 
We can now introduce responsibility ethics as a yet more favourable framework for 
replacing ‘justice thinking’ styles of ethics. Responsibility ethics is born out of care ethics in that 
it takes into account the notion of caring; however, it looks beyond the mother-child relationship 
as the epitome of a caring relationship capable of representing all humans. Instead it takes this 
notion of “caring for one another” and expands it. Margaret Urban Walker’s 
expressive-collaborative model of responsibility ethics posits that when one is caring for another, 
that person in some sense has a responsibility to the person for whom they are caring (Walker, 
1998, p. 78). It is this notion of “responsibility” that is of greatest importance because people do 
not only have responsibilities to those for whom they care, but they also have responsibilities to 
those who care for them, we have responsibilities to our community, even those members of our 
community with whom we lack any direct relationship. This is important because responsibility 
implies a sense of duty and accountability. In other words, we do not necessarily have to ​care 
about someone else in order to have some sort of responsibility towards them. "Responsibility” 
does not do away with the notion of caring and rather caring becomes but one example of a 
responsibility we might have towards another (Walker, 1998, p. 108).  
Care ethics historically gave rise to responsibility ethics in order to limit the 
overemphasis care ethics places on the role and importance of a maternal voice (as a voice for all 
women) which provides a limited and narrow view of ethics. While the maternal voice certainly 
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provides some important insights that are helpful to STE, using it as a basis for a complete 
ethical theory loses sight of STE’s goal of addressing the gender binary by looking through too 
narrow of a lens. An ethics of responsibility, however, is able to continue from where care ethics 
was incomplete, simply by examining further what is at the root of “caring”. When we care for 
someone, in some sense we also have a responsibility to them. While caring can certainly play an 
important role in responsibility, it is not a prerequisite for that responsibility to exist. We may not 
automatically ​care ​in a real and concrete way about those people we have never met, or for such 
an abstraction as “humanity as a whole”, but we certainly have a ​responsibility​ towards these 
people. We have a responsibility to not cause harm to others and if we are able to positively 
influence or affect others in some sort of capacity then we have a responsibility to do so. It is in 
this ​responsibility​ that we can find more solid ground to work from than we could with care 
ethics.  
Care ethics brings us in the right direction in that we are moving past the “masculinist” 
views of traditional ethical theories and thus it appears suitable for moving towards the goal of 
improving transactions. Sullivan, however, posits that rigid gender binaries should receive urgent 
attention and should remain an important point for these changes. While care ethics does move 
us a step into the right direction in the sense that it is “testing” gendered ways of acting and 
thinking by bringing the perspectives and experiences of women from the private sphere to the 
public sphere, thus challenging the dominant masculinist perspectives, it does fall short in some 
important ways. Care ethics challenges gendered perspectives, but does so by positing female 
gendered perspectives. Replacing one gendered moral theory with another gendered moral theory 
does not address this issue at the source which is the ​rigid gender binaries​. So while care ethics 
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is a promising contributor to STE’s goal of addressing gender binaries, there are various flaws it 
possesses which limit its effectiveness for breaking these gender binaries down and, thus, for 
enriching STE.  
While concern has been raised in regards to “the authority of some men to represent 
‘people’,” the same criticism can be raised about “the authority of some women to represent 
‘women’” (Walker, 1998, p. 24). Many feminists have critiqued care ethics because it places an 
over-emphasis on the role and the importance of a particular type of maternal voice as a voice for 
all women, and as a voice which all ​people​ should listen to as a moral authority. It makes various 
assumptions, including the assumptions that (1) there is only one single maternal voice 
representative of all mothers, (2) that all women possess a maternal voice, and that (3) that 
maternal voice is the same for every woman across every period of time, across every culture, 
and across every individual situation regardless if she is a mother or not (Saul, 2003, p. 216, 
Walker, 1998, p. 57). Beyond all, it assumes that the maternal voice is one which should be 
valued more than any other, so much so that it is capable of functioning as a source of moral 
authority for everyone.  
Other theorists, including Walker (1998) are critical of care ethics, as she states care 
ethics “valorizes stereotypes of bottomless feminine nurturance and self-sacrifice that continue to 
haunt women while politically disempowering and personally exhausting them,” (p. 108). While 
care ethics ​does ​take into account the changing position and situation of those that it is assessing, 
it does so from the single fixed perspective of a maternal voice that attempts to understand all 
moral situations in terms of caring. In addition, this single fixed perspective is one that is harmful 
to women since it perpetuates oppressive stereotypes of what it means to be a woman. Women’s 
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bodily existence extends far past the limiting role of caretaker, and in fact, may not even include 
this role at all. As Walker (1998) notes, “a care ‘ethic’ can look like the lamentable 
internalization of an oppressively servile social role” (p. 108).  
A theory of ethics that situates itself, not only as a fixed perspective, but as a fixed highly 
rigid ​gendered​ perspective could never be sufficient to truly enrich STE. Sullivan focuses on the 
changing nature of the individual through her emphasis and focus on the transactional and 
discursive nature of the body. Just as standard ethical theories fall short due, in part, to their 
limited and fixed perspective, care ethics falls short for this same reason. In addition, Sullivan 
has made it clear that in order to improve human transactions, an essential step must include the 
move away from rigid gender binaries. Care ethics cannot support this goal of STE in a truly 
meaningful way because care ethics essentially rests upon a single fixed perspective and because 
this perspective is a rigid gendered perspective that perpetuates harmful stereotypes of women, 
both of these reasons make care ethics fundamentally incompatible with STE as a whole.  
A meaningful point that care ethics and responsibility ethics highlight is the application 
of morality to the supposedly “private sphere” of life. While we abandon care ethics going 
forward, it has certainly brought us a step in the appropriate direction.  One major sense in which 
traditional ethical theories have been masculinist is in the way they only applied morality within 
the “public sphere” of life. This can be seen as a result of a majority of theorists being men who 
often had wives at home taking care of the family and other private matters. Since this aspect of 
life was left for the women to manage it was deemed unimportant and low-ranking on the list of 
things worth discussing, thus leaving the private sphere of life unfit for philosophical discussion 
(Saul, 2003, p. 213-214). In addition, avoiding such discussions allowed them to avoid truly 
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noticing and examining women’s position in society and was thus “important to preserving the 
subordination of women,” (Saul, 2003, p. 214). Theories were constructed to make sense only if 
people were “autonomous rather than fundamentally interdependent,” and so women’s position 
in society was often at odds with these theories (Saul, 2003, p. 214). In other words, the 
avoidance of applying theory to the “private sphere” works to “keep some people and what 
happens to them outside the view of some authoritative community of mutual moral accounting” 
(Walker, 1998, p. 172).  
An example of avoidance to address the private sphere of life, which functioned to 
maintain women’s position in society second to men, can be found in the application of laws 
regarding rape. Rape laws have been applied differently depending on whether the rape occured 
within the “private sphere”, involving a husband and a wife, or outside of this sphere, involving a 
man and a woman who do not know one another (Walker, 1998, p. 173). Prejudices like these 
become “culturally normative” in that the prejudices themselves are not questioned or 
deliberated upon, so “it feels like business as usual” (Walker, 1998, p. 181). Bringing attention to 
the private sphere of life and examining it as it deserves to be is an important way that feminist 
ethical theories can be used to enrich STE and help to further Sullivan’s goal of addressing 
oppressive attitudes and behaviour. Where care ethics fails to fully address this issue due to it 
functioning within the gender binary, responsibility ethics offers a means past these 
shortcomings.  
In order for transformation and change to occur, the categorization of rigidly gendered 
habits must be changed. Any theory that operates within these “rigid gender binaries” will only 
contribute to the continuation of harmful gendered transactions and stereotypes and, thus, 
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oppressive attitudes and behaviours. As Sullivan (2001) states, “to eliminate [old habits and 
customs] without creating new ones is to ensure that only the old habits and customs are 
available to fill their own place” (p. 95). If the habits that traditional ethical theories have helped 
to create are to be transformed or changed, there must be some other structure for discussing 
ethics that can replace it. That structure cannot be found in care ethics because care ethics is 
merely replacing one gendered way of thinking with another gendered way of thinking. So due to 
the fact that care theory relies very heavily on favouring the maternal voice and perpetuates the 
binary association of women with parenting it is hardly a satisfactory replacement. This is where 
we can begin to see the need and benefit of turning entirely away from a theory of ethics which 
is overly focused on one perspective, especially a gendered perspective, whether implicitly or 
explicitly.  
Responsibility ethics goes beyond the gendered perspective found in justice style ethics 
in that it is not limited by a male-dominated perspective. By “male-dominated perspective” I do 
not mean a perspective that is ​innately​ male, or a perspective that is held by all male individuals, 
only that these perspectives are heavily influenced and informed by the privileged positions and 
experiences males are often afforded in society, as all major theorists have been male. It might 
help to look more closely at what ​makes ​a perspective or habit “gendered”. It certainly is not the 
mere nature of being classified as male at birth, but rather a by-product of the different 
experiences, transactions, and learned habits that such authors confront and learn as a 
consequence of being assigned male. While there may prove to be subtle differences based on 
sex, “the size and the significance of those biological differences will depend, ​in every single 
instance​, on the situational context in which women and men live their lives” (Bem, 2007, p. 
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141). It is in the way in which children are raised and taught to transact with others that shape 
these gendered habits. Since each one of us must think from our own situated perspective, it can 
be difficult to think beyond or outside of our own gendered perspectives as is evident with 
traditional ethical theories including care ethics. However, becoming aware of these 
perspectives, as responsibility ethics attempts to do, can help to mediate them.  
In addition to the concern of its limits, care ethics also loses some of its traction when 
taking a deeper look at how the term “care” itself is defined. It is unclear who exactly we should 
be caring for and who should be caring for us. Noddings (2013) defines caring as involving an 
encounter or sets of encounters “characterized by direct attention and response”, which is to say, 
“it involves the establishment of a caring relation, person-to-person contact of some sort” (p. 
153). This requirement of a direct connection between carer and cared-for raises the concern as 
to who one is in fact obligated to care about beyond such relationships, for example, larger 
obligations to people we will never meet, such is the case with massive environmental pollution 
or the use of nuclear weapons (Card, 2002, p. 151). Noddings (2013) does allow for the notion of 
“caring about” (in contrast to “caring for”), though this is vaguely defined as varying from 
simply “expressing concern” without acting on that concern, to perhaps “making a donation to a 
charitable organization” (p. 162). While it is true that we might “care about” a problem, this does 
not fully capture what our obligations or responsibilities to act may entail. Perhaps we should be 
obligated to care about these problems, but this does not really tell us very much in terms of 
moral actions or duties. So in addition to its limited perspective, care ethics is further limited in 
the scope of its applicability. Within STE, it becomes clear that we are part of many different 
communities or environments on many different scales, and we transact with each of those 
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environments in different ways, and so one holds a variety of different responsibilities within 
each of these communities or environments.  
There are many individuals who may influence or have responsibilities regarding us and 
whom we may also influence and hold responsibilities regarding, and yet we may never actually 
physically encounter each other. Care ethics could not adequately account for these transactions 
since it involves some sort of connection between the carer and the cared for or simply the notion 
of caring about without any sort of action. It does not follow that we have no more than an 
obligation to “care about” these individuals in an abstract sense, rather we have a responsibility 
to these individuals to act regardless if we “care about” them or not. Our obligation is in taking 
responsibility, on an individual and collective scale, for human pain and suffering in the world in 
the form of action. What these responsibilities look like will differ from person to person and 
will often be limited to a person’s community and the things that they can do at that moment. 
These actions could be as simple as questioning a sexist comment someone makes to something 
more involved such as volunteering one’s time for a local cause. There are many opportunities, 
both large and small, that arise for a person to act on and thus to take on the responsibility of 
improving the world for one another.  
The idea that we hold responsibilities for one another is not a new idea within ethics. 
Walker (1998) claims that “it has been revealing to see which-- or better, whose-- responsibilities 
are spotlighted as representative of ‘moral obligations,’ and which [whose] do not show up at 
all” (p. 77). Responsibilities have always had a role in ethics; however, it is those responsibilities 
that men within the public sphere hold that are seen as representative of “moral obligations” as a 
whole, while those responsibilities that we see in the private sphere of life that involve women’s 
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responsibilities to her family and within her home (as prescribed by society) have long been 
ignored and essentially seen as irrelevant within morality. The problem with this is that 
predominantly “men’s responsibilities” are not representative of a large majority of people, 
including women and other marginalized groups. This same sort of problem is evident within 
care ethics which views responsibility through “the lens of ‘care’” and thus focuses solely on 
caretaking responsibilities (Walker, 1998, p. 78). In the face of “the distribution of caring labours 
disproportionately to women in our society, more disproportionately still to women who are 
relatively poor and nonwhite,” care ethics provides us with an ethics that does not apply well to a 
large majority of people and circumstances (Walker, 1998, p. 78). This is significant because “if 
gender is a feature of status revealed in who gets to do what to whom, it also shows in who is 
expected or permitted to do what to whom.” (Walker, p. 78).  
Walker (1998) notes that “gender partly consists in distinct assignments and assumptions 
of responsibility, and attracts them” (p. 78). These responsibilities, however, can reach beyond 
“caring” to provide a more complete picture of human ethics. Responsibilities are not only to 
others, but also to oneself, to one’s community, and to humanity as a whole. As a result, 
responsibility ethics is able to take those things within care ethics that showed the most promise 
and build upon them in a manner that will provide a more applicable theory that is more in tune 
with STE. This is possible because the underlying notion of “caring” is the idea that we have 
responsibilities to ourselves and to others. Therefore, focusing on responsibilities in general, 
rather than only through the lens of caring and the maternal voice, a greater ethical scope is able 
to be established.  
Section 4: ​How responsibility ethics will serve STE better than care ethics 
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In contrast to the limited scope of action prescribed by caring, Walker (1998) presents 
responsibility as a practice that is realized through action and engagement (p. 60). Walker (1998) 
describes responsibility in terms of practices and so through allotting and accepting 
responsibility there is a sense in which we are required to act or “practice” responsibility (p. 94). 
We can see how the practice of responsibility is action-oriented through the examples of things 
that we can be responsible for, including “specific tasks or goals, roles with discretionary 
powers, acts and failures to act, outcomes and upshots of actions, contributions to outcomes that 
are not ours alone, and attitudes, habits, and traits” (p. 94). In accepting responsibility, for 
performing a certain gendered habit for example, one is acknowledging the need for change and, 
thus, must act in a way that reflects having taken responsibility for such a habit. It becomes 
apparent that the language of “caring” is not extensive enough to encompass the abundant and 
intricate types of responsibilities found within and across individuals and their communities. We 
can look again to Walker (1998) who puts it succinctly, “I prefer the more capacious language of 
responsibility as a conceptual framework for ethics; it invites us to follow the trails of people’s 
diverse responsibilities through different domains” (p. 78).  
Sullivan’s transactional epistemology defines bodies in terms of their actions, so an ethics 
that is focused on the practice of allotting and accepting responsibilities will serve STE better 
than an ethics that places a narrow focus on the action of caring. Caring for another can exist as a 
general feeling of “caring about” them, which would not necessitate action as we can care about 
something or someone without acting on that feeling. And when caring can be seen in terms of 
action, these actions are often narrow in scope due to the fact that caring has long been a 
gendered action. As Walker (1998) states, “while caring is fundamental, the amount and degree 
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to which it is taken up is largely based on gender” (p. 78). We can see this in the way that 
“gender partly consists in distinct assignments and assumptions of responsibility,” as caring 
becomes but one type of responsibility largely assigned and assumed by women (Walker, 1998, 
p. 78). 
Within Walker’s expressive-collaborative model of responsibility ethics, the goal is to 
uncover what morality ​is​ and what it is ​for​ by looking at “moral life as a continuing negotiation 
among​ people, a practice of mutually allotting, assuming, or deflecting responsibilities of 
important kinds, and understanding the implications of doing so.” (Walker, 1998, p. 60) 
Collaboration is a necessary aspect of action when considering ethical problems. Walker (1998) 
notes that all moral agents are “​situated​ in (typically multiple, overlapping) epistemic 
communities,” ​and “it is communities, not individuals, that maintain the resources for acquiring 
and certifying knowledge,” (p. 57). Walker’s (1998) expressive-collaborative model looks at 
how moral knowledge is “produced and sustained within communities,” (p. 59). In this way, 
actions are evaluated based not only on the people directly involved, but also on how those 
actions fit within and are understood by the community as a whole.  
As Claudia Card (2002) states about Walker’s responsibility ethics, “we have 
responsibilities regarding many people...with whom either we do not share moral understandings 
or it is unclear what moral understandings we share” (p. 150). This means that we will not 
always find agreement between or across communities in terms of what is right or wrong, so 
while we may not share moral understanding with one another, there will be responsibilities on 
which we can agree to, such as the responsibility “not to poison [other communities’] water, soil, 
and air” (Card, 2002, p. 150). Relationships within an ethics of responsibility therefore are 
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coherent with STE’s transactional and discursive body in the way that responsibility ethics 
understands the individual as enmeshed within a complex array of relationships across multiple 
communities and also the importance of taking this point into consideration if we are to truly 
understand the morality of an action or actions as they must be understood in relation to the 
moral understandings of the community in which they arose. This is important because it 
acknowledges the impossibility of establishing an objective account of morals, but rather finds 
common ground between individuals, communities, and cultures in terms of responsibilities we 
hold to one another.  
In addition, an ethics of responsibility helps to enrich STE by addressing moral problems 
in such a way that mediates for gender differences. While traditional ethical theories are more 
applicable to the “public sphere” of life, not to mention ​men’s​ experience of the “public space”, 
and care ethics focuses more closely on the “private sphere” of life from the woman's 
perspective, responsibility ethics is applicable across both these spheres of life and across 
gender. As Walker (1998) notes, “a lot of what we need in order to understand specifically moral 
judgements or principles goes beyond specifically moral matters. We need to understand a ​social 
world​.” (p. 203) Therefore, the social world in its entirety, including both private and public 
spheres of life, must be examined. Responsibility ethics does not favour a particular experience 
when considering or explaining ethical problems, but rather allows the person or people and 
environments to set the stage for inquiry. This is important if we are to move past rigid gender 
binaries and understand individuals within the contexts that helped to establish their habits and 
styles of acting. When working alongside STE, an ethics of responsibility can help to turn the 
“causal arrow” around so that instead of blaming one’s classification as a particular gender, race, 
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or class for one’s actions, we can uncover how one’s various environments have influenced these 
actions. Then we can begin to move beyond the confines of such harmful labels and stereotypes. 
Responsibility ethics moves past the problem of individual responsibility to encompass 
group and collective responsibility, which is also cohesive with STE in that a person cannot be 
viewed in isolation from their environments and those around them. There is difficulty in doing 
this, however, as it does involve the act of balancing responsibility between the individual as 
well as the social structures which have influenced that individual.  By placing a greater focus on 
individual relationships, as care ethics tends to do, the influence of our environments and 
community tends to fall into the background. While placing greater focus on the environment 
might cause the role of individual agency to instead fall into the background. A person must 
remain responsible for their actions and the choices that they have made, while at the same time 
acknowledging the role and influence that environments may have played in making those 
choices.  
Acknowledging the role of a person’s various environments in their choices and actions 
is not to remove responsibility from that person, but simply to gain a deeper understanding of 
that person and their individual situation. This can help us to recognize and address issues as 
they arise and help to mediate harmful stereotypes of people. If people within a poorer 
community are stealing it might be easy for others to stereotype those people as untrustworthy 
and weak-willed. These people are still responsible for their actions and should be held 
accountable; however, by examining the influence of the environments in which they made the 
decision to steal, it could be revealed that there are not enough social resources available and 
something should also be done about this lack of resources. This example shows how individual 
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responsibility should exist alongside social responsibility and how understanding the two 
together​ can begin to move us beyond the careless and uncritical act of stereotyping people.  
An ethics of responsibility takes into account our interconnectedness with others and the 
environments in which we exist. This is where responsibility ethics answers with a much broader 
and encompassing perspective that acknowledges the presence of different points-of-view and 
the ways that our position in the world and to one another can affect how we view ethical 
responsibility. Walker (1998) states that “an expressive-collaborative model looks at moral life 
as a continuing negotiation ​among​ people, a practice of mutually allotting, assuming, or 
deflecting responsibilities of important kinds, and understanding the implications of doing so” (p. 
60). It acknowledges the historical and social context that we live in and makes judgements 
within this context and allows for disagreements without compromising respect and 
responsibility towards others. 
Responsibility ethics supports STE’s notion of discursive and transactional bodies by 
acknowledging the continuously changing nature of human life and the need to take the 
environments into account. Responsibility ethics ​situates​ the individual in a way that previous 
ethical theories have not been successfully able to do and can therefore help to mediate the 
concern about gender binaries. The outcome of rigid gender binaries, expressed in gendered 
performances and prejudiced and oppressive actions and attitudes, can become something that 
we take collective responsibility for perpetrating. While both traditional ethics and care ethics 
have seemed to posit a “pre- or nondiscursive body” in the ways that they both view gender 
differences as inherent differences linked to one’s sex rather than differences of social and 
cultural influence, responsibility ethics unequivocally posits a discursive body.  Responsibility 
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ethics, therefore, is able to enrich STE by providing a framework for evaluating human actions 
that can work alongside STE in hopes of challenging rigid gender binaries. Furthermore, 
responsibility ethics helps to provide us with the tools to understand and respect when others are 
testing gendered habits outside of the contexts that formed them.  
Responsibility ethics is active and progressive in that it allows us to hold ourselves, as 
well as others, accountable for actions and attitudes. In regard to accountability, Walker (1998) 
notes that 
Practices of holding each other responsible ​do​ have a fundamental and critical role in 
trying to secure certain states of affairs open to impact by human attention and effort, 
especially those consisting in or bearing on harms and benefits to other people (or 
beings). (p. 93).  
The practice of holding one another accountable, therefore, provides us with a greater potential 
for changing oppressive attitudes than did previous theories. Sullivan (2001) explains how 
change can be made possible “through the effects of many…local and minor alterations of the 
habits that produce a culture’s gender constructs...the reconfiguration of a culture’s gender 
categories can begin.” (p. 107) Utilizing responsibility ethics in reply to gender constructs is an 
important step to beginning the process of drawing our attention towards the existence of these 
constructs and to those people they may harm or benefit, thus opening the possibility for 
criticism and effort towards change.  
These small changes towards the improvement of transactions in the world can occur 
when certain gendered habits are “tested” outside of the context that formed them. Sullivan 
(2001) provides the example of the “woman philosopher” (p. 105-6) who must learn to combine 
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what society views as a “woman” with what academia views as a “philosopher”. The habits of 
each can become contradictory with women expected to be more passive and gentle than men, 
while philosophers, having historically been men, have a more masculine expectation of being 
aggressive and forward with their arguments. These two different habits or roles will combine in 
various ways, as Sullivan (2001) states: 
To be a woman philosopher is to have developed the conflicting habits of both a ‘good’ 
woman that politely defers to others by means of her bodily and verbal gestures and a 
‘good’ philosopher whose bodily and verbal gestures are part of his aggressive 
argumentation and defense of claims. (p. 106).  
The conflict between the two opposing habits of this example has the potential to create friction 
between this female philosopher and her colleagues or individuals in her personal life as they 
may misunderstand certain habits of transacting that she has developed. Through the framework 
of responsibility ethics, we would look at her behaviour within the context of the communities in 
which she is a member and attempt to understand how her style of transacting has been 
influenced by this. As a result of this, we can begin to assign responsibility on a more collective 
scale as we recognize that these gendered habits of transacting are shaped by our collective 
participation in performing them. We can thus acknowledge the ways these constructs have 
either harmed or benefited her and those around her. Her contradictory actions arose from 
contradictory gender constructs as opposed to some innate character flaw within this woman. 
When we become aware of the reality of gender constructs, we can begin holding one another 
responsible by opening dialogue and laying ground for critical examinations.  
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Utilizing responsibility ethics within the context of STE in this way is important because 
if “testing gendered habits outside of their context” is necessary to challenging gender binaries 
then this will certainly create conflicts between different habits as they are pushed further and 
further outside of their contexts. Responsibility ethics can provide us with the framework for 
understanding and mediating these conflicts. When one is able to understand that the conflict has 
emerged as a result of gender habits, this can encourage us to continue to question them and 
learn how to accept them for what they are. This can be done most fruitfully when an ethics of 
responsibility works alongside STE so that they may continually inform one another.  
Regarding the cultivation of moral understanding amongst individuals, Walker (1998) 
states that “these understandings may be fragile and temporary bridges, or they may settle into 
firm common ground” (p. 202). Nonetheless, it is in the encouragement and attempt to reach 
these understandings that there is hope as these understandings are the basis for responsibility 
towards others. While we remain hopeful for this “firm common ground” to be reached through 
understanding others’ beliefs and customs in the context of their environments, responsibility 
ethics accounts for the fact that this is something that will not always be attained nor be obtained 
easily. This supports Sullivan’s belief that improvements and positive change must be worked at 
over long periods of time as challenging gender binaries is done with the hope of creating 
understandings among individuals that “may settle into firm common ground”. 
One way the stereotypes that emerge from rigid gender binaries can be harmful is in their 
potential to create a self-fulfilling prophecy, in that all it takes for stereotypes to function is that a 
person be aware of the stereotype’s existence (Walker, 1998, p. 196, 197). This is called 
“stereotype vulnerability” and has been observed across studies which suggest that “stereotypes 
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may work directly in situations and interactions to alter behaviour and perception, not through 
beliefs that embody or affirm them, but rather through beliefs ​that ​the stereotypes exist.” 
(Walker, 1998, p. 196, 197) The fact that other people believe stereotypes is enough to affect our 
behaviour, which is rather alarming and lends support to Sullivan's urgency in needing to address 
gender binaries. As Walker (1998) expresses, we can be held responsible in a multitude of ways 
and at different levels, such as “specific tasks or goals” to “outcomes that are not ours alone, and 
attitudes, habits, and traits.” (p. 94) When assessing the moral content of others actions we must 
learn to also assess the extent to which society has criticized these actions as right or wrong and 
on what basis. For example, is a woman really a “bitch” for being assertive? ​Or​ is she just 
assuming a habit that is perfectly acceptable in men, and it is her gender and the context in which 
she is acting that are responsible for this assessment? Examining responsibility ethics within STE 
can provide us with a means for critical reflection when considering such problems.  
It becomes essential that our habits influenced by gender binaries are assessed and 
challenged. Responsibility ethics presents us with some tools to move towards this goal by 
presenting us with a different way of understanding morality that attempts to account for these 
concerns. In contrast, care ethics embraces gender binaries by promoting a theory of ethics that is 
grounded in a stereotypical gendered perspective of woman as the caregiver. Responsibility 
ethics can enrich STE better than care ethics can by encouraging critical self-reflection. In 
addition, the ideas that an ethics of responsibility puts forward are more consistent with those of 
STE by supporting the notion of a discursive transactional body. Even more importantly, 
responsibility ethics and STE both aim to challenge rigid gender binaries and can together inform 
one another and aid the reaching of this goal. Not only is it important that we address and 
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challenge gender binaries, but through responsibility ethics, actually doing so can be described as 
a moral responsibility we have for one another. For these reasons, responsibility ethics is better 
suited than an ethics of care for enriching STE.  
Conclusion:​ An ethics of responsibility can enrich STE. 
To conclude, feminist ethical theories continue to evolve, as seen through care and 
responsibility ethics, much as our understandings of ourselves and our environments continue to 
change and evolve over time. As care ethics emerged to address the shortcomings of traditional 
ethical theories, so too has responsibility ethics emerged as a broader understanding of ethics, in 
the process addressing the shortcomings of care ethics. Ethics exists as a form of knowledge that 
is continually evolving as we work out new ways of understanding ourselves and our 
environments.  As Sullivan (2001) states, “truth is not a matter of humans ‘fitting’ their beliefs to 
the world. Nor is it a matter of matching internal representations to external reality. It is a mutual 
negotiation and transformation of a relationship between humans and their environments” (p. 
144). Ethics also possess this ability to evolve over time. As we have seen new ethical theories 
arise, often in response to the criticisms or shortcomings of the theories that preceded them, we 
will continue to see new theories arise that build upon responsibility ethics as well as other 
ethical theories.  
This constant evolution seems to find some stable ground through STE, on which we can 
question, learn, and know about the world in a way that takes into account how humanity 
changes through the notions of transaction and discourse. Sullivan acknowledges that this 
transactional understanding of bodies is also a form of knowledge that will evolve over time as it 
is cross-fertilized with other theories and built upon by other theorists. Understanding bodies as 
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both transactional and discursive, and as such, existing in a constant state of “transaction” and 
“change”, provides us with a means for making sense of this continual evolution. No 
environment or individual exists in a static and unchanging state. For an ethical theory to enrich 
STE it is essential for that theory to understand the person and their environments as mutually 
constitutive of one another, so as to align with STE’s major tenets of understanding bodies as 
transactional and discursive.  
While care ethics and responsibility ethics both offer theories that agree with these major 
tenets, an ethics of care falls short due to its reliance on a static and unchanging perspective. 
Care ethics does take into account the need to address ethical issues on a situation by situation 
basis and does not attempt to gain objectivity through its application of the maternal perspective; 
however, this use of a single fixed perspective is one of the reasons that care ethics is ultimately 
unsuccessful in contributing to STE. The role of change reveals that there can never be a single 
maternal perspective that all mothers would agree is fully representative of their own. By relying 
on a static perspective as the basis for its inquiry, care ethics is unable to accurately view people 
as transactional and discursive.  
Responsibility ethics moves beyond the problems of care ethics by providing a more 
comprehensive view of the individual that doesn’t focus on or favour a particular “voice” or 
point of view, but rather applies itself more generally and is thus better equipped to serve STE 
than care ethics. Moral issues are still dealt with on a situation by situation basis, but the 
perspective from which judgements are made is not predetermined at the outset of that inquiry as 
it often has been within traditional ethical theories and care ethics. Rather, responsibility ethics 
acknowledges that each individual will be making inquiries from their own perspective which 
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has been influenced by their own experiences and environments and it is these individual 
viewpoints that will determine the perspective from which judgements are made. From here a 
greater appreciation can be given towards understanding the unique experiences and perspectives 
of those whom we are considering for our inquiries. There is a sense of collaboration by which 
the moral agent is not being judged by means of some perspective, whether that be an objective 
“God’s eye” perspective or a maternal one, but rather by another person. Collaboration is present 
in this sense as moral inquiry exists as a conversation that must take place by which each person 
attempts to gain a mutual understanding of one another’s position. Because responsibility ethics 
does away with the use of fixed perspective as the basis for its inquiry, responsibility ethics is 
better suited than care ethics to enrich STE as it is able to accurately view people as transactional 
and discursive.  
Since Sullivan views gender binaries as in urgent need of attention, and the goal of this 
paper is to enrich STE, it would follow that we address this binary itself as it exists within ethics 
if that ethics is to in any way enrich STE. Care ethics was brought in as an alternative to “justice 
thinking” in ethics which some criticized as favouring a ‘masculine’ point of view and way of 
thinking. Yet, care ethics has also been similarly charged with favouring the ‘feminine’ point of 
view and way of thinking by focusing on maternal thought. This shows exactly why the gender 
binary needs urgent attention. In attempting to provide a “different voice”, care ethics instead 
simply moves us from one end of the binary to the other.  
What is required is a move away from an ethics that excludes women as well as an ethics 
relevant primarily to women (not to mention ​only one​ possible aspect of woman’s identity), 
towards an ethics that does not focus on one end of the binary, but rather attempts to operate 
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outside​ of this binary while also accounting for it. In an effort to challenge and move beyond the 
application of rigid gender binaries we must avoid theories that are responsible for perpetuating 
this binary, such as we saw in traditional ethical theories, and later within care ethics. Rather 
what is needed is an ethical theory that will take the progress that care ethics made in terms of 
bringing attention to the private sphere of life, while moving past the use of a gendered 
perspective that is supportive of unwanted gender stereotypes. We were able to find this within 
responsibility ethics.  
Responsibility ethics not only takes into account the evolving and ever-changing nature 
of our existence by accurately viewing the individual as transactional and discursive, but it also 
moves beyond the confines of rigid gender binaries as means for understanding the world. 
Walker acknowledges that moral understanding must be in relation to an understanding of the 
social and cultural context--or environments--in which one exists, which necessarily includes the 
influence of gender constructs. As Walker (1998) stresses, “the single most important claim of 
this book is that a lot of what we need in order to understand specifically moral judgements or 
principles goes beyond specifically moral matters. We need to understand a ​social world​.” (p. 
203) Walker presents similar ideas to those found in care ethics in that we must look beyond 
“specifically moral matters'', or in other words take into account more than the individuals 
involved and the facts of the situation to include what Walker calls a “social world”. This social 
world encompasses the “discursive and transactional body”. The social world can be described as 
encompassing the current discourse and transactions that occur within a community without 
separating the private and public spheres of life. In this way, an ethics of responsibility 
compliments ideas found within STE.  
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In addition to and because of this, we can discover how an ethics of responsibility can 
enrich the epistemology of STE. Sullivan encourages the coming together of various theories in 
service of similar goals while mutually enriching one another. As a result of this, responsibility 
ethics helps to facilitate movement towards an important goal for Sullivan, which is to improve 
transactions and thus improve bodily existence. This is done largely by addressing harmful and 
oppressive constructs within society. Rigid gender binaries are an important construct which 
Sullivan notes “requires great urgency”. Gender binaries continue to be sustained by habits that 
have originated over time due to avoidance or lack of knowledge of the complex nature of the 
person in transaction with their environments. Sullivan notes that habits indeed can be quite 
difficult to change once established; however, there is always hope and potential for change.  
A way these habits can be changed is by “making the ordinary seem strange” by 
experiencing certain habits out of context, such as the example of the philosopher woman 
(Sullivan, 2001, p. 105). Sullivan describes this in detail: “In subtle and often unconscious ways, 
friction between these conflicting habits occurs virtually any time a woman philosopher transacts 
with others, whether inside or outside the academy” (Sullivan, 2001, p. 106). This “can generate 
ways of being gendered that slightly shake the sedimented masculine and feminine habits.” 
(Sullivan, 2001, p. 106). Experiencing certain gendered habits outside of the types of 
transactions that helped to form them can help to make us particularly aware of and ultimately 
question the habit. Since care ethics rests on the notion of gendered habits (i.e. maternal care), it 
would be unable to aid progress in the way that Sullivan describes.  
Gendered habits outside of the contexts that formed them would still be assumed as 
feminine or masculine within care ethics, and so there would arise a difficulty in truly breaking 
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and challenging these habits. In contrast to this, responsibility ethics can work effectively 
alongside STE to understand why that habit seems “out of place” when experienced in this 
different way, and what harms or benefits these gendered habits might afford to those practicing 
them and those encouraging or reinforcing them. In other words, responsibility ethics 
complements STE in this goal of addressing and challenging gendered habits and thus the gender 
binary.  
It is Sullivan’s hope that this persistent form of challenging the binary will become useful 
in learning to accept and eventually break these habits. Sullivan states that when a habit is 
changed it must be replaced with a new one to take its place. An ethics of responsibility is useful 
in moving towards this goal as it centralizes the social world and thus provides a means for 
navigating morality that works to mediate gender binaries. Responsibility ethics helps to mediate 
gender binaries by avoiding universal and abstract theory that is supposed to speak for all people 
while also avoiding placing emphasis on any specific one perspective over another. It avoids 
these problems by concentrating on the social world as a means of understanding moral 
problems. Responsibility ethics can provide us with a framework for evaluating moral problems 
and understanding the extent and content of our role in that evaluation, therefore, providing us 
with a new moral theory to lean on as we break down the harmful habits originating from 
traditional ethical theories as well as care ethics. It is for all these reasons that responsibility 
ethics can operate alongside STE in such a way that is mutually informative and beneficial and 
thus ultimately helps to enrich STE.  
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